BRUSNIAK'S 2000 PROPERTY TAX CASE LAW DIGEST
© 2001 John Brusniak, Jr. (All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.)
Texas Supreme Court | Texas Court of Appeals | Texas Attorney General
TAXPAYER WHO SETTLES VALUATION DISPUTE WITH TAXING AUTHORITIES AND PERFORMS CONTRACT FOR MANY YEARS MAY NOT LATER CLAIM VALUATION SCHEME WAS ILLEGAL.
Fort Worth Independent School District v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. 2000). [OPINION]
In 1936, taxpayer/phone company was involved in protracted litigation with the city over the correct methodology to be used in valuing its easements which ran through the city. It settled this dispute and others, by agreeing to pay a portion of its gross receipts to the city "in lieu" of property taxes. It ceased making these payments in 1992 and claimed that these payments were illegal because they were not based on any recognized valuation methodology and because the appraisal district had replaced the city as the entity responsible for valuing property for taxation as of 1982. The Supreme Court disagreed with this analysis and ruled that the phone company could not challenge the illegality of the scheme since it had knowingly and voluntarily participated in the scheme for so many years. By doing so, it had waived its rights to contest the methodology. The court further ruled that "neither a taxing authority nor a taxpayer can circumvent the constitutional restrictions on, or requirements for, taxation merely by agreeing to settle a dispute. But by the same token, a fair settlement of a legitimate dispute that contemplates the market value of the property is not unconstitutional simply because it is not an appraisal and assessment done by standard procedure."
BOOK VALUE OF INVENTORY MAY BE PROBATIVE OF MARKET VALUE.
Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Dallas Central Appraisal District, 53 S.W.3d 382 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied). [OPINION]
Taxpayer filed suit challenging valuation of inventory of merchandise. Appraisal district relied upon the book value of the inventory in its valuation process. The books were kept in accordance with generally accepted accounting techniques utilizing the lower of cost or market technique. Taxpayer claimed that inventory had to be appraised using appraisal techniques and that using accounting techniques was illegal. The court disagreed ruling that "book value of inventory may be probative of market value by either serving as some indication of market value or by being equivalent of market value...We decline Sear's invitation to hold that, as a matter of law, inventory book value derived according to generally accepted accounting principles is not equal to market value."
DELINQUENT TAX LIENS ATTACH TO PROPERTY WHICH IS ENCUMBERED WITH A LIEN OWNED BY THE R.T.C.
Sadeghian v. City of Denton, 49 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). [OPINION]
Taxpayer acquired a mortgage lien interest on property from the R.T.C. and subsequently foreclosed title. Taxpayer sued the taxing units for declaratory judgment under the terms of FIRREA contending that no delinquent tax lien attached to the property. The court disagreed, ruling, "...because the RTC held only a lien interest, and did not acquire an ownership interest in the property during the tax years in question, '1825(b)(2) does not act as a bar to attachment of a tax lien on the underlying real property during the period that the mortgage [was] held in receivership by the RTC."
JURISDICTION OVER DELINQUENT TAX SUITS INVOLVING DECEASED OUT OF COUNTY OWNERS IS IN THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE PROPERTY IS LOCATED.
Phifer v. Nacogdoches County Central Appraisal District, 45 S.W.3d 159(Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied).
Taxpayer died in 1973, and his wife was appointed administrator of his estate. No taxes were paid on the taxpayer's property thereafter. Taxing unit filed suit in district court in 1989. In 1994, following the rejection of its claim by the probate court, the taxing unit filed suit seeking to collect its taxes in the probate court. It entered into a settlement agreement in the probate court along with taxing units from five other counties agreeing to relinquish its statutory lien on the property in favor of a lien on sales proceeds from the sale of the entire estate. After the property sold, the taxing unit proceeded to obtain a judgment in the original district court proceeding for its taxes and foreclosure of its lien. The estate appealed this judgment. The court of appeals ruled that the legislature's subsequent addition of Section 5C to the Texas Probate Code had resolved this matter. That provision vested exclusive jurisdiction over property tax disputes involving property located in counties other than the county of probate, exclusively in the district court for the county where the property was located.
DELINQUENT TAX LIENS ATTACH TO PROPERTY WHICH IS ENCUMBERED WITH A LIEN OWNED BY THE F.D.I.C.; PENALTIES WILL ONLY ATTACH TO THE EXTENT THE PROCEEDS FROM THE FORECLOSURE SALE EXCEED THE AMOUNT OF THE UNDERLYING LIEN.
PNL Asset Management Co. v. Kerrville Independent School District, 37 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. dened). [OPINION]
Taxpayer acquired a lien interest from the F.D.I.C. on real property which the borrower from a failed bank had defaulted in his obligations to pay the underlying property taxes. Taxpayer foreclosed the lien interest. Taxing units sued the taxpayer for the delinquent taxes. Taxpayer defended on the grounds that the provisions of FIRREA prevented the delinquent tax lien from attaching to the real property. The court disagreed, ruling that the provisions of FIRREA only prevented the lien from attaching to the F.D.I.C.'s lien interest, and not to the underlying fee estate, and that the penalties were similarly not barred from attaching because the taxing unit "should be paid the penalties because its lien securing payment of the penalties had priority over [the taxpayer's] security interest."
DELINQUENT TAX LIEN ON SEPARATELY OWNED REAL ESTATE IMPROVEMENTS ATTACHMENTS TO UNDERLYING LAND WHEN THE TWO ESTATES MERGE.
Franz v. Katy Independent School District, 35 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). [OPINION]
Taxpayer leased land to a restaurant owner for construction of building. The lease provided that the lessee would be responsible for payment of the taxes on the improvement, but that title to the improvements would not vest in the taxpayer/lessor until the end of the leasehold term or until a termination of the lease upon default by the lessee. The appraisal district, based on a request by the parties, listed ownership of the improvements in the name of the lessee. Lessee failed to pay the property taxes on the improvement and also defaulted on the lease. The lessor took possession of the improvements and filed suit for declaratory judgment against the taxing units seeking a declaration that the lien on the improvements did not extend to the underlying land. The court ruled against the lessor stating that the lien on the improvements extended to the underlying land as a result of the doctrine of merger immediately upon the termination of the lease and the assumption of ownership of the improvements.
TAXPAYER MAY NOT UTILIZE SECTION 25.25(D) OF THE TEXAS TAX CODE TO CHALLENGE THE UNDERLYING PRIOR YEAR VALUATIONS OF A PROPERTY SUBJECT TO AN OPEN SPACE LAND ROLLBACK TAX; THE TAX CODE PROCEDURES DO NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION.
Tarrant Appraisal District v. Gateway Center Associates, Ltd., 34 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.). [OPINION]
Appraisal district issued a notice of rollback on property which had been previously granted open space land valuation. The taxpayer did not challenge the rollback, but instead filed a motion, under Section 25.25(d) of the Texas Tax Code seeking to challenge the underlying appraised values of the property for the years subject to the rollback assessment. The court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion since it was not timely filed. "No new valuation of the property is made to set the amount of the rollback tax; the tax amount is simply calculated based on the past market values set forth in the tax rolls. ... Because owners of agricultural land are informed of the appraised market value of their land in the notices of appraised value, they are sufficiently alerted to any error in the appraised market value at the time of the appraisal. ... Therefore, even though they are not taxed on the market value of their land, these owners have the right to protest the appraised market value immediately upon receiving their notice of appraised value, long before any rollback tax may be imposed because of a change in use. ... Any motion made pursuant to section 25.25(d), including a motion to correct the appraised market value of agricultural property, must be filed before the date the yearly property taxes-not the rollback taxes-on the subject land become delinquent." The court further ruled that no due process rights were violated because the taxpayer had been given notice of the market value of the property in each of the underlying years and had also been afforded the opportunity to have a hearing on those valuations during those years.
MOTIONS TO CORRECT ERROR UNDER SECTION 25.25(C) ARE BARRED IF THE TAXPAYER PREVIOUSLY FILED A NOTICE OF PROTEST, BUT FAILED TO APPEAR FOR THE PROTEST HEARING OR IF THE TAXPAYER PREVIOUSLY SIGNED A WRITTEN AGREEMENT PERTAINING TO THE VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY; INTERSTATE ALLOCATION IS NOT ALLOWED UNDER SECTION 25.25(C)(3) IF THE AIRCRAFT HAD SITUS WITHIN THE TAXING JURISDICTION.
Aramco Associated Co. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 33 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied).[OPINION]
Taxpayer owned an aircraft which flew between Houston and Saudi Arabia. The aircraft had a taxable situs at both locations. Taxpayer sought retroactive interstate allocation of the aircraft under Section 25.25(c)(3) of the Texas Property Tax Code. Citing Section 25.25(d), the court denied the interstate allocation for two years because the taxpayer had filed notices of protest for those years, but failed to appear for the scheduled hearings and denied the allocation for an additional two years because the taxpayer had entered into written valuation settlement agreements for those years. It denied the remaining year in issue, by disagreeing with the opinion issued in Himont U.S.A., Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 904 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App,-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ), and ruling that the existence of situs of the aircraft in the county barred any remedy under Section 25.25(c)(3).
TAXPAYER MAY NOT CHALLENGE PRIOR YEAR VALUATIONS OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ROLLBACK UNDER SECTION 25.25(D).
Anderton v. Rockwall Central Appraisal District, 26 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied). [OPINION]
Taxpayer owned land which had previously qualified for open space valuation. The appraisal district sent the taxpayer a notice of intent to rollback the tax valuation. The taxpayer did not contest the change of use determination. Instead, prior to the delinquency date, the taxpayer timely filed a motion under Section 25.25(d) of the Property Tax Code seeking to redetermine the five years of valuations underlying the rollback assessment. The taxpayer contended that the statute allowed such revaluation of taxes prior to their delinquency. The court disagreed, ruling that market valuations of properties which have been granted open space land valuation status, need to be contested during the tax year in which such valuations are made. It stated, "...any motion made pursuant to section 25.25(d), including a motion to correct the appraised market value of agricultural property, must be filed before the date the yearly property taxes on the subject land become delinquent."
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATION MAY NOT REPRESENT PARENT CORPORATION IN COURT WITHOUT A WRITTEN DESIGNATION OF AGENCY HAVING BEEN FILED WITH APPRAISAL DISTRICT; DESIGNATION OF SUBSIDIARY CORPORATION AS OWNER OF PROPERTY BY APPRAISAL DISTRICT ON ITS RECORDS DOES NOT CONFER JURISDICTION FOR PURPOSES OF SUIT; STATUTE AUTHORIZING CORRECTION OF MISNOMER OF PARTIES DOES NOT CURE DEFECTS IN JUDGMENTS PRE-DATING THE STATUTE AND DOES NOT ALLOW FOR CORRECTION WHERE THE WRONG TAXPAYER HAS BEEN NAMED AS A PARTY TO A SUIT.
Torneau Houston, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 24 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). [OPINION]
Appraisal district, in its records and notices, showed subsidiary corporation to be owner of property. Taxpayer protested valuation of the property and subsequently filed suit in the name of the subsidiary, even though the property was owned by its parent corporation. Appraisal district sought and obtained a dismissal of the suit on the grounds that the suit had not been brought by the owner of the property. The court of appeals upheld the dismissal, ruling that the subsidiary corporation could not represent the parent corporation in these proceedings without having first filed a written designation of agency with the appraisal district. The fact that the appraisal district had erroneously designated the subsidiary as the owner of the property in its records did not cure this defect. Additionally, the subsidiary could not avail itself of the new statute authorizing belated corrections of misnomers because this suit was dismissed prior to the effective date of the new statute and more importantly, because the new statute did not authorize an amendment where an incorrect owner has been named, only the correction of technical errors in a taxpayer's name.
TAXPAYERS WHO FAILED TO RECORD THEIR DEED AT THE COURTHOUSE OR APPLY FOR A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION WITH THE APPRAISAL DISTRICT COULD NOT LAWFULLY CONTEST THE RETROACTIVE REMOVAL OF THEIR HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION.
Dallas Central Appraisal District v. Brown, 19 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). [OPINION]
Taxpayers purchased a residence in 1992 and occupied it as their homestead. They failed to record their deed to the property in the deed records and to apply for a homestead exemption with the appraisal district. In 1997, the appraisal district learned that the prior owner was no longer occupying the property and removed the exemption which had been granted to the previous owner retroactively for five years. When the new owners subsequently applied for the exemption, the appraisal district granted them an exemption for the current tax year and the preceding tax year. It refused to grant the exemption for any other years. The court of appeals upheld the denial of exemption, ruling that the homestead exemption granted to the previous owners had terminated upon the sale of the property and that the appraisal district could not be held culpable for its failure to send a notice of appraised value to the new owners, as required by Section 25.19 of the Property Tax Code, when the new owners failed to record their deed at the courthouse.
ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE IN SUITS INVOLVING ALLOCATION OF VALUE OF PROPERTY USED IN THE STREAM OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
Tex-Air Helicopters, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 15 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App. -Texarkana 2000, pet. denied).
Taxpayer prevailed in a suit against appraisal district demanding interstate allocation of aircraft and sought recovery of attorney's fees, as well. The court refused to award such fees ruling that the statute, and supporting case law, clearly allowed such fees to be recovered only in cases involving excessive valuation or unequal treatment of property. The issue of allocation of valuation of property moving in the stream of interstate commerce does not fall into either of these categories.
AUTOMATIC STAY OF PROCEEDINGS FOR PROPERTIES IN BANKRUPTCY DOES NOT APPLY TO SUITS FILED BY TAXPAYERS AGAINST THE APPRAISAL DISTRICT.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Denton County Appraisal District, 13 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). [OPINION]
Taxpayer filed suit against appraisal district alleging excessive valuation. Thereafter, taxpayer filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The district court dismissed the taxpayer's suit for want of prosecution. Taxpayer appealed the dismissal claiming that it violated the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The court of appeals disagreed and upheld the dismissal, ruling that the automatic stay provisions only applied to suits brought against the debtor, and not to suits brought by the debtor. Since the debtor/taxpayer initiated this suit, the automatic stay provisions were inapplicable.
TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
MEDICAL OFFICE BUILDING LEASED BY HOSPITAL DISTRICT TO PRIVATE PHYSICIANS IS NOT EXEMPT.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0311 (2000). [OPINION]
A public hospital district leased a medical office building to private physicians. In the lease, the hospital district restricted the type of medical equipment the physicians could utilize in their offices. This was intended to encourage the physicians to send their patients to the hospital for certain procedures, and they did. The hospital earned significant income from this relationship. The attorney general was asked whether the office building could be considered exempt under these circumstances. The attorney general ruled that it could not because the building was "not held only for public purposes and devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public."
A COUNTY MAY NOT ENTER INTO A TAX ABATEMENT AGREEMENT WITH AN OWNER OF A TAXABLE LEASEHOLD ESTATE.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0300 (2000). [OPINION]
A county wished to enter into a property tax abatement agreement exempting tangible personal property for ten years, provided that the taxpayer would, in turn, enter into a long term lease of real property owned by the government. The attorney general ruled that such an abatement agreement would be illegal because Section 312.206(a) of the Texas Property Tax Code only authorizes counties to enter into abatement agreements with owners of taxable real property, and a lessee of property is not an owner of taxable real property.
QUALIFYING PROPERTY FOR EXEMPTION AS A YOUTH DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION WITHOUT CHANGING THE UNDERLYING AGRICULTURAL USE DOES NOT TRIGGER A ROLLBACK TAX ASSESSMENT.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0299 (2000). [OPINION]
A youth development association owned a tract of land which it leased to area farmers. It also utilized the property for its own activities. The land had been previously granted open-space valuation. The taxpayer sought exemption for the property under Section 11.19 of the Texas Property Tax Code. When such exemption was granted, the appraisal district triggered a rollback assessment contending that such change in status automatically required the assessment. The taxpayer contended that the agricultural activities were continuing, and as a result, no change of use had occurred. The attorney general agreed and ruled that, under these circumstances, no rollback had been triggered.
COUNTY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS CREATED TO DEVELOP TOURISM MAY NOT LEVY PROPERTY TAXES AND MAY NOT CONSTRUCT INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISIONS.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0291 (2000). [OPINION]
A county development district was created under Chapter 383 of the Texas Local Government Code. The district wished to levy a property tax and to utilize these funds to build infrastructure in a residential subdivision. The attorney general ruled that the district could not act in this fashion. It could not levy a property tax since there existed no constitutional or statutory authority authorizing it to do so, and it could not build the infrastructure since the statute authorizing its creation limited its functions to the development of tourism. Creating residential infrastructure was not within the scope of developing tourism.
LOCAL TAXING UNITS MAY NOT ENTER INTO CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENTS WITH "TAX FERRETS" TO LOCATE UNTAXED AND OMITTED PROPERTY.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0290 (2000). [OPINION]
A person wished to set up a business in Texas aiding local taxing units in locating untaxed and omitted property. It wished to do so on a contingent fee basis. It inquired of the Attorney General whether such activities would be legal. The Attorney General ruled that they would not be legal. He ruled that Texas had a long history of antagonism toward contingent fee arrangements in tax matters and as a result "...without express authority, no taxing unit...may enter into a contingent fee, tax ferret contract....In light of the legislative policy against a taxing unit entering a contingent fee contract, authority to do so should not be implied."
TAX ASSESSORS MAY REFUND MONIES ERRONEOUSLY PAID IF THE ERROR WAS CAUSED BY A MISTAKE OF FACT, BUT THEY CANNOT REFUND THOSE MONIES IF THE ERROR WAS CAUSED BY A MISTAKE OF LAW.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0286 (2000). [OPINION]
Taxpayer entered into the business of selling heavy equipment during the tax year. It erroneously believed that it was required to collect and tender inventory taxes during its initial year of operation. When it discovered that it had not been required to do so, it sought a refund of the taxes under Section 31.11 of the Texas Property Tax Code. The assessor refused to refund the taxes citing the operation of the voluntary payment rule. The attorney general ruled that Section 31.11 of the Texas Property Tax Code operated as a partial waiver of the voluntary payment rule, but only under specific circumstances. The attorney general further ruled that erroneous payments made as a result of a mistake of fact would be subject to refund, but that erroneous payments made as a result of a mistake of law would not be refunded.
TRAVEL TRAILERS AFFIXED TO LAND BELONGING TO SOMEONE OTHER THAN THEIR OWNER ARE TYPICALLY TAXED AS PERSONALTY, BUT UNDER RARE CIRCUMSTANCES THEY MAY BE TAXED AS REALTY; TRAVEL TRAILERS PERMANENTLY AFFIXED TO THE GROUND AND TRAVEL TRAILERS SITTING ON GROUND BELONGING TO THEIR OWNERS ARE TAXABLE AS REALTY; THE FAILURE BY A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TO GIVE CORRECT NOTICE OF ITS INTENT TO TAX OPTIONALLY TAXABLE PERSONALTY MAY VOID THE ASSESSMENT.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0282 (2000). [OPINION]
The attorney general ruled that travel trailers which are attached to leased lots will generally remain the property of the lessees of the lots and as such will be taxed as personalty and not as realty except in rare instances when the lessees intended to give up their ownership rights in the trailer. Under those circumstances, the trailers should be taxed as realty. Under Section 1.04(3)(A) of the Property Tax Code, a travel trailer which has been permanently affixed to the ground is taxable as real property. Under Section 1.04(3)(B) of the Property Tax Code, a travel trailer, which is not affixed, but which is located on land owned by the owner of the trailer, may also be taxed as real estate. If a taxing unit fails to comply with the requisite statutory notices and public hearing requirements to tax personal property which would otherwise be exempt, those assessments may be void.
A TAX ASSESSOR-COLLECTOR WHO IS NOT CERTIFIED BY THE BOARD OF TAX PROFESSIONAL EXAMINERS MAY NOT COLLECT A MOTOR VEHICLE INVENTORY TAX.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0273 (2000). [OPINION]
A county tax assessor-collector is not required to be certified with the Board of Tax Professional Examiners if the assessor has contracted with the appraisal district to collect all of the county's taxes. An assessor, whose office had contracted with the appraisal district to collect its taxes, inquired of the attorney general as to whether the certification exemption would remain in place if the assessor merely collected the motor vehicle inventory tax and related reports. The attorney general ruled that the exemption would not apply, and the assessor would need to register because the motor vehicle inventory tax was a property tax, and the collection of same constituted an act which could only be performed by a licensed individual.
ONCE A HOSPITAL DISTRICT HAS CONVERTED OPERATIONS FROM CHAPTER 282 OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE TO CHAPTER 286, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HOLD AN ELECTION TO RAISE IT'S AD VALOREM TAX RATE.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0247 (2000). [OPINION]
A hospital district was created under the authority of Chapter 282 of the Health and Safety Code. That provision allows the commissioners court in a county with a population of 75,000 or less, with the approval of the voters, to create a hospital district. A provision in the code allows the voters to convert such a hospital district into a constitutionally authorized district. In such a conversion election, the voters are required to set the tax rate for the district. Subsequent to such an election, the hospital district wished to hold another election to raise its rate to the constitutionally authorized maximum rate. The attorney general ruled that the hospital district could not conduct such an election because there existed no constitutional or statutory authority for such an election. Once a tax rate is set in a conversion election, it will remain in force and may not be changed.
A MUNICIPAL TAX ABATEMENT GRANTED TO A TAXPAYER WHO IS SUBSEQUENTLY ELECTED TO THE CITY COUNCIL WHICH GRANTED THE ABATEMENT IS PROPORTIONATELY ABATED AS OF THE DATE ON WHICH THAT PERSON OFFICIALLY TAKES OFFICE.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0236 (2000). [OPINION]
A property owner, who had previously been granted a municipal tax abatement, was elected to the city council for the city which granted the abatement. The attorney general had previously ruled in JC-0155, that the election required the discontinuance of the abatement. In this opinion, the attorney general ruled that the abatement would need to be discontinued effective on the date on which the person actually took office, and it would need to be pro-rated for that tax year.
A HOSPITAL DISTRICT MAY CONTINUE TO LEVY AND COLLECT TAXES AFTER IT CEASES OPERATIONS AND LEASES THE FACILITIES TO A PRIVATE ENTITY PROVIDED THAT THIS IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CITIZENS; THE CLOSURE OF A HOSPITAL DOES NOT RELIEVE A HOSPITAL DISTRICT OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROVIDING SERVICES TO ITS NEEDY CITIZENS; THE DISTRICT MAY PROVIDE SERVICES TO NON-INDIGENT INDIVIDUALS PROVIDED IT CHARGES THOSE PERSONS FOR ITS SERVICES.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0220 (2000). [OPINION]
A county-wide hospital district could legally close its hospital and lease its facilities to a private entity which would continue to provide services to the indigent if this was in the best interest of the citizens of that county. The district could under those circumstances continue to levy and collect taxes. The closure of the hospital did not relieve the hospital district of its obligation to provide medical services to the needy citizens of the county. The district could provide services to non-indigent residents provided that those individuals were billed for the actual cost of the services.
STATUTORY AMENDMENT AS TO QUALIFICATION OF PERSONS TO SERVE ON APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD WAS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND DISQUALIFIED ANY PERSONS WHO DID NOT MEET THE STATUTORY TERMS; PERSON WHO SERVED AS APPRAISAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY WAS STATUTORILY INELIGIBLE TO BE APPOINTED TO APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD; ALL PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH THESE INELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS PARTICIPATED WERE VALID.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0192 (2000). [OPINION]
The legislature enacted statutory revisions to Section 6.412 of the Texas Property Tax Code pertaining to the eligibility of persons to serve on appraisal review boards. The statute did not contain any grandfather clauses, as had prior similar statutory revisions. The revisions made persons who had served three or more terms, or who had appeared before the appraisal review board for compensation ineligible for continued service. The attorney general ruled that these provisions were effective upon enactment and immediately disqualified any individuals who were in violation of the new provision. The attorney general further ruled that the appointment of the appraisal district's attorney to the appraisal review board violated the previous statutory prohibition contained in Section 6.413 of the Texas Property Tax Code against appointment of individuals who had a contractual relationship with the appraisal district. Notwithstanding the ineligibility of these persons to serve, none of the actions to which they were a party were invalid since they were de facto officers of the review board.
NEW STATUTE PROVIDING FORMULA FOR ALLOCATION OF VALUE OF CORPORATE AIRCRAFT FLOWN IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE IS RETROACTIVE FOR TAX YEAR 1999, BUT MAY NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY UNDER SECTION 25.25(C)(3) FOR YEARS PRIOR TO 1999.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0180 (2000). [OPINION]
The legislature enacted Section 21.055 to the Texas Property Tax Code which created a formula for allocation of corporate aircraft flown in the stream of interstate commerce. The attorney general ruled that the provisions of this section constituted substantive law and would only apply retroactively to the year of enactment of the statute, 1999; but that they could not be applied retroactively under Section 25.25(c) (3) of the Texas Property Tax Code to any prior years.